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Within  the  context  of liberalisation  experienced  by the  Malian  economy  since  
the  beginning  of  the  1990s,  spatial  integration  of  cereal  markets  has  been  
considered  as a major  tool  as to  avoid  localised  shortages  due  to  production  
shortfalls.   However,   market   dynamic   reveals   since   then   new   patterns:   the 
diversification   of   urban   consumer   demand   towards   “modern   cereals”,   in 
particular  rice  and  maize,  drives  the  segmentation  of  the  cereal  market.  As 
consumers  are likely to substitute  traditional  cereals, like millet  and  sorghum,  
for other  cereal types, new market  segments  emerge. 
We account  for this  evolution  with  a theoretical  model  à la Hotelling: the  good  
is  considered  according  to  two  characteristics,  the  spatial  localisation  (local 
market) and  the cereal type. We show that, as far as market  integration  implies  
the reduction  of transaction,  it affects  the strategic decisions  of sellers. In fact, 
incentives   to   invest   in   product   differentiation   (and   exploit   new   market  
segments)  rises  relatively  to  the  incentives  to  take  advantage  of spatial  price 
differentials, as they decrease. 
Last,   we   test   this   analytical   proposition   on   price   data   collected   by   the  
agricultural  market  information  system  (SIM/PAM) from  1990  to  2004  on  6 
local markets  in central  and  northern  Mali. We apply a vector  error- correction  
model,   and   find   evidence   for   the   intensification   of   spatial   co- integration  
relations  during  the  period.  Moreover,  we relate  this  latter  dynamics  to  the 
evolution  towards  the  segmentation  of cereal  markets  in Mali. Last, the  leader  
markets  of this progression  are identified  as being the central urban  markets.
Keywords  : product  differentiation,  co- integration,  cereals, Mali Introduction: 
In   order   to   match   the   requirements   of   structural   adjustment   programs,  
agricultural  policies  implied  in developing  countries  tried  to promote  market  
integration.  Since  then,  food  policies  mainly  aimed  at  securing  cheap  cereal 
supply  to  urban  consumers,  and  to  achieve  this  aim,  governments  regulated  
the  prices  of major  crops,  both  pan- seasonally and  pan- territorially. However, 
the   subsequent   price   incentives   to   producers   were   depressed   and   the 
productivity   growth   very   slow.   To   prevent   the   countries   from   declining  
production  levels,  governments  removed  legal  constraints  to  private  cereals  
marketing  and  let  supply  and  demand  determine  producers  and  consumers  
price. Nonetheless,  they rapidly saw that  basic market  institutions  were failing  
for  the  market  reform  to  be  effective.  The  Market  Information  System  was 
introduced  to reduce  marketing  costs  trough  greater  market  transparency, and  
thus  improve  market  competition  and  facilitate  the  entry  of new stakeholders  
into the production,  wholesale  and  retails markets.
In this  framework,  the  market  is considered  as an nationally integrated  space, 
competitive   and   open   towards   other   countries,   where   market   information  
increased  marketing  flexibility  by letting  farmers  know  which  location  is the  
more  profitable  to  market  their  products.  The  efficiency  benchmark  is then  
market   ability   to   reduce   transaction   cots   and   intermediaries’   margins,   to 
insure   producers’   access   to   remote   places   and   to   supply   consumers   with 
products  sold  at  affordable  and  stable  prices.  In developing  countries  where  
food   security   is   one   of   the   major   policy   concern,   market   integration   was 
considered  as a key tool in order  to secure  crop  supply in whole country.
This  view  is at  the  heart  of  the  analysis  led  by experts  and  policy  makers.  
Regional  policies  that  promote  tariff  unions  (like  the  West  African  Monetary  
Zone, WAMZ) expand  this framework  at a regional level.
The  case  of cereals  in Mali reflects  this  evolution.  At the  core  of the  Cereal 
Market  Reform  Program  implemented  in 1981  stand  the  choice  of building  an 
integrated   national   market,   in   order   to   prevent   food   crisis   and   famines.  
Studies  focused  on the  spatial  dynamics  of local markets:  however,  parallel to 
this  integration  process,  we can also  observe  the  emergence  of new marketing  
strategies  that  have been  disregarded  by economic  analysis. The rise  of maize  
consumption,  especially in urban  areas,  set  new  incentives  for  producers  and  
traders  to  differentiate  their  supply,  not  only  spatially  but  also  according  to 
variety. As the  returns  to local monopolies  (or oligopolies) are decreasing  with 
market  integration,  agents  turn  to new strategies  to restore  their  margin  to its 
previous  level. 
In  the  following  development,  we  propose  to  study  this  joint  dynamics  of 
spatial  integration  of  the  Malian  cereal  market  and  products  differentiation  
that  emerged  there.  We first  develop  which  are the  main  questions  at stake  in 
the  Malian  case. We present  then  a theoretical  model  that  stand  for  the  joint  
evolution   of   spatial   integration   and   product   differentiation   on   the   Malian cereals  market.  We then  test  this  dynamics  using  price data  for the  millet  and  
maize  markets.
1. Liberalisation  and integration  of the Malian cereal market
1.1.Grain production  in Mali
Mali ranks  among  the  poorest  countries  in the  world  (according  to the  Human  
Development  Index  developed  by UNDP for  2003,  it is ranking  in the  174th  
position  as  177  countries  are  classified). However,  when  considering  it at the  
Sahel region’s level, it appears  to be viewed  as a large agricultural  country  with 
a high  potential:  as  early  as  in  the  1930’s,  the  French  colonial  government  
heavily invested  in the development  of the Niger valley, with the aim of making  
Mali   a   regional   rice   granary.   The   primary   sector,   namely   agriculture   and  
livestock, provides  work  for close  to 70% of the  active population  (34% of GDP 
in 2004,  OECD 2005). Apart  of it, gold  mining  is a relatively  recent  sector  of 
the Malian economy, but the production  remains  random  in the last years.
The  role  of  cereals  is  thus  very  important:  approximately  70% of  the  total  
calories  in the  average  diet  come  from  cereals. Millet, maize  and  maize  are the 
major  rain- fed  staples.  They  are  produced  by  small  producers  with  market  
access,   except   those   of   the   dynamic   cotton   area 1.   Grain   production   is 
geographically  as  well  as  annually  very  variable  due  to  fluctuating  rainfall. 
Furthermore,  the  percentage  of total  production  that  is marketed  is very low 
(between   15   and   20%)  so   that   the   market   is   very   tight   and   prices   highly 
volatile.
1.2.Market reforms,  market  construction
The   liberalization   of   cereal   marketing   occurred   under   the   program   PRMC 
(Programme  de Restructuration  du Marché  Céréalier) that  was heavily financed  
by international  donors.  Up until  this  date,  the  market  was  regulated  by an 
official   grain   marketing   agency:   the   government   fixed   the   consumer   and  
producer  prices  of the  major  crops  on  the  whole  territory.  The consequences  
of the reform  have been  major  chances  in price determination  in the marketing  
system.  The key market  institution  that  has  proven  to be effective  in building  
the  market  was the Market  Information  System  (SIM, Système  d’information  de 
Marché,  now  called  OMA Observatoire  des  Marchés  Agricoles  or  Agricultural  
Market  Watch). It aimed  at developing  a national  technical expertise  needed  to 
produce  accurate,  reliable  information  for clients  and  to improve  the  timeless  
transmission  of this  information  (radio  diffusion  was  widely used). Moreover, 
it developed  credit  programs  oriented  to producers’ unions  and  traders.
Trade  liberalisation  was  at  the  core  of  PRMC: and  as  a  result  of  improved  
knowledge   of   market   opportunities,   it   increased   marketing   flexibility   for 
farmers  who then  know  when  and  where  it was the  most  profitable  to market  
their  products.  The improved  integration  of the national  market  should,  on the  
1 Rice is grown  in the government- established  irrigation  projects, that  of the Niger office and  
in lowland- inland  swamps  (bas fonds)one  hand,  increase  producers  income  by increasing  producer  prices, and  offer  
them  the  opportunity  to produce  more.  On the  other  hand,  it should  decrease  
the   price   paid   by   the   consumers   as   it   decreases   transaction   costs   and  
intermediaries  margins.  
1.3.Cereals  production  growth  and  structure
During   the   25   years,   cereals   production   almost   tripled   (table   1).   But   the  
composition   of   cereal   production   also   changed:   as   millet   and   sorghum  
represented  more  than  80% of total  production  at the  beginning  of the  80’s, it 





Millet- Sorghum  
%
80,4  54,3
Maize                         % 4,5  13,6
Rice paddy                 % 12,2  31,4
Total s         1000  t. 1,148,9 2,682,8
Sources  : FAOSTAT
Table 1: Repartition  of fed- rain cereals  between  1980- 82 and  2002- 2004
Moreover, in 2002- 04, the  third  of total  production  is maize.  Contrarily to the 
determinants  of  production   growth  for  millet   and  sorghum   that   relies   on 
cultivated  areas,  that  of  maize  is  due  to  an  increase  in  yields.  Cereals  are 
produced  mainly  in the  centre  of the  country,  particularly  around  Koulikoro,  
Sikasso, Ségou and  Mopti.
1.4. Market  efficiency and  segmentation
Researches  on  market  spatial  integration  have  been  led  since  the  80’s. They 
mostly   use   correlation   coefficients   (Dembélé,   Traoré   et   Staatz,   1999)   and  
found  that  the integration  level reached  in the central  regions  is high, and  that  
remote  areas  tended  to become  more  integrated  to the  national  market  in the  
1990’s. Most of the studies  only investigated  millet and  sorghum  as maize  was 
far less consumed  (Barry, 1989). 
They conclude  on  an  improved  diffusion  of price  information  at the  national  
level that  reinforce  competition  among  traders.  
We refer  to  this  literature  and  propose  to  develop  the  study  by  first  using  
accurate  statistical  and  econometrical  tools  to  study  more  precisely  the  co-
movement  of prices  in Mali. We had  maize  to this  study  to take  into  account  
the  diversification  of species  and  varieties  we can  observe  in this  country.  As 
urban  consumers  are  turning  to  modern  cereals  that  fit with  their  taste  and  
cooking  habits,  a new  opportunity  emerges  for  traders  and  producers.  When 
millet price increases,  consumers  will tend  to buy other  cereal types.
On a more  analytical point  of view, we borrow  from  industrial  economics  (Bain, 
1959) that  can be used  to analyse  the  efficiency of food- producing  agriculture  
in developing  countries  (Moustier, 1996). As soon  as in the 1970’s, competition  
and  efficiency were linked  as to explain  the sluggish  adjustment  of local prices  in   African   countries  (Jones,   1972   and   1974).   With   the   improvement   of 
statistical   tools,   the   approach   was   soon   renewed   by   cointegration   models  
(Ravaillon,  1987), and  long  debated  (Harris,  1979  ;  Harris  et Palaskas,  1993). 
We   follow   this   tradition   and   develop   the   question   in   the   new   industrial  
economics  perspective.
2. Understanding  the joint evolution  of integration  and segmentation  of 
cereal markets  in Mali: a theoretical model
2.1. Hypothesis  
In   the   following   section,   we   develop   an   analytical   framework   that  
highlights  the  influence  of market  integration  on sellers’ behaviour.  The latter  
choose  to market  products  endowed  with strategic characteristics  as they tend  
to compete  with distant  local markets.  
Using  a model  that  takes  into  account  product  differentiation  à la Hotelling 
(1929),  we show  that,  when  transport  costs  are  high,  geographic  dimension  
dominates   other   product   characteristics:   sellers   are   thus   not   incited   to 
differentiate  the  good  they are marketing. Geographic  dispersion  protect  them  
from   competition,   as   each   is   established   on   a   local   market.   However,   as 
transport  costs  are  increasing,  geographic  distance  doesn’t  shield  them  from  
national  competition  and  product  differentiation  works  then  as a way as to let 
competition  soften.  This condition  can be interpreted  as the firms’ response  to 
the profit  erosion  due to transport  costs’ decrease. 
We   analyse   a   differentiated   market:   the   seller   choose   two   product  
characteristics,  that  is  marketing  location  and  product  type.  Therefore,  the  
seller  enjoy  a localised  market  power  on the  neighbouring  consumers:  even  if 
the  total  number  of sellers  is high, one  particular  seller  directly compete  with 
only   a   few   number   of   them.   The   market   is   considered   as   segmented   in 
different  sub- markets  where  sellers  are more  or less captive – that  is that  they 
have  to bear  additional  costs  if they  want  to get a product  that  is not  sold  by 
the  most  neighbouring  seller.  The  analysis  led  by Hotelling  (1929)  presented  
two  distinct  strategies:  if the  sellers  choose  to  locate  in  the  middle  of  the  
market,  they  have  a greater  market  potential  but  they  tend  to suffer  under  a 
very harsh  competition.  If they choose  to locate  at different  place, their  market  
power   is   restricted   to   a   smaller   market,   but   they   soften   competition. 
D’Aspremont  and  al. (1979)  show  that  competition  in price  is the  strongest  
force  leading  location  choice  and  tends  to  promote  spatial  dispersion.  We 
extend  these  frameworks  for the  case  where  the  product  is endowed  with  two 
characteristics. 
We solve the model  by inverse  induction: we first  derive market  size  according  
to chosen  pricing  strategy,  then  we induce  from  this  first  result  the  choice  of 
product  characteristics  (location  and  variety).
We consider  a market  with  2 sellers  denoted  by 1 and  2. Products  are defined  
by two  characteristics:  the  marketing  location  (x) and  the  variety  (horizontal  differentiation,  y). Consumers  exhibit  preferences  along  these  characteristics, 
they  are  uniformly  distributed  according  to  these  preferences.  We are  thus  
considering  products  differentiated  on a plane.
We consider  a consumer  whose  preferred  location  is (a,b). The selling  charges  
the consumer  with transaction  costs  so that: 
2 2 ) ( ) ( ) , , ; , ( b y t a x t p S p y x b a U i b i a i i i i - - - - - =     for     i=1,2
We thereby  choose  a traditional  form  for the  utility function  (Combes  et 
al,  2005)  and   enlarge  it   so   that   it  takes  into  account  two  instead  of  one 
characteristic.   The   more   a   considered   product   is   different   from   that   the  
consumer   prefers,   the   lower   the   utility   level.  S  represents   the   consumer  
surplus  from   which  we  subtract  the  price  and   the  mismatch  between  the  
purchased  good  and  the  one  that  should  have brought  the  higher  satisfaction.  
The   weights   affected   to   the   two   characteristics   can   be   different   (ta  ¹   tb) 
according  to  the  way  the  consumer’s  disutility  increases  when  the  product  
doesn’t correspond  to the perfect  location. 
The  marginal  consumers  that  are  indifferent  between  purchasing  goods  by 
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This line separates  the set of characteristics  (the plane) into two different  sub-
markets  that  represent  consumers’ demand  addressed  two the  sellers. We find  
the   traditional   trade- off   we   mentioned   before   between   a   central   location  
subject  to a tough  competition,  and  a peripheral  one which is protected.  
2.2. The demand  functions
This  demand  depends  on  the  relative  weight  of  each  characteristic  in  the 
consumers’   utility   function.   We   choose:   ) ( ) ( 1 2 1 2 y y t x x t b a - < -   for   which   the 
weighted  difference  between  two locations  of characteristic  2 is higher  that  for 
characteristic  1. This  correspond  to  the  fact  that  transportation  cost  are  less  
important  (or valorised) that  horizontal  differentiation.  As these  costs  are paid 
by the consumers,  it is identical to say that  transportation  cost are decreasing. 
According  to the relative position  of prices  and  characteristics’ valorisation,  we 
obtain  three  specifications  for the demand  function:
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2.3. The equilibrium  price
This  represents  the  reaction  function  of  a  seller  according  with  respect  to 
consumers’  preferences  and  the  price  charged  by the  competitor.  The  seller 
chooses  strategically the  price he proposes:  if it is low, the  market  size  will be 
high  (he  has  a  high  attractive  power),  but  the  profitability  per  unit  is  low. 
Conversely, if the  price  is high, the  number  of consumers  disposed  to pay for 
the  good  will be lower. Caplin and  Nalebuff  (1991) identified  the  conditions  of 
existence  and  uniqueness  of price  equilibrium.  The  utility  function  chosen  in 
our  case  is  a particular  case  of  that  chosen  by  Caplin  et  Nalebuff  and  the  
uniform  distribution  of consumers  over  the  preferences  corresponds  to  their 
framework.  We infer  from  their  result  that  a pure  strategy  unique  equilibrium  
exists  for each location. Moreover, Irmen  et Thisse  (1998) demonstrate  for a n-
dimension   space   that   this   strategy   belongs   to   the   intermediary   interval 
described  above.
When maximizing  profit   ) , ( ) ( ) , ( 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 p p D p p p p = P
We obtain, for each p2
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We derive the same  equality for p2 , so that  the price equilibrium  is
1 ) ( 4
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a b a2.4. Location  choice  
As he knows  the equilibrium  price for each location  he could  choose, the seller  
maximizes  hos profit  over the possible positions.
We find (x1,y1) and  (x2,y2), the profit  maximizing  choice. For  ) , ( 1 1 y x ,
) , , , ( ) , , , ( ) , , , ( 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 y x y x D y x y x p y x y x = P
thus
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= P  because  p1=p 2
We find
x1= x2=0,5
and  (y1= 1 ; y2=0) and  conversely (y1= 0 ; y2=1)
We  conclude   that   the   differentiation   is   minimal   (x1=   x2=0,5)  for   the   less 
profitable  characteristic,  and  that  it  is  maximal,  (y1=  1 ; y2=0)  and  (y1=  0 ; 
y2=1),  for   more   profitable   one.   When   transportation   costs   are   decreasing,  
sellers  will  strategically  decide  to  differentiate  their  products  according  to 
their   varieties.   When   transportation   costs   are   inexistent,   the   framework  
presenting   the   differentiation   according   to   one   characteristic   applies: 
d’Aspremont  and  al. (1979) show that  the optimal  strategy is to protect  oneself 
from  competition  by differentiating  the product  supply as much  as possible.3. Empirical strategy: millet and maize  market  dynamics
3.1. Data
Data  consist  in price  series  collected  by SIM/OMA (Système  d’Information  de 
Marché/Observatoire  des  Marchés  Agricoles  or  Market  Information  System/  
Agricultural  Markets  Observatory) 2 in Mali from  April 1989  to August  2004. We 
consider  two  cereals:  millet  and  maize  over  7 local  markets:  Segou,  Sikasso, 
Mopti,   Kayes;   Bamako,   Tombouctou   and   Gao,   ordered   by   decreasing  
population  size. Summary  statistics  are given in Appendix  1.
Figure 1: Political map of Mali 
We observe  a general  increase  of  prices  during  the  period  (see  variation  in 
mean  prices  between  1990  and  2003  in  Appendix  1), but  the  way  standard  
errors  between  the  same  years  are  varying  is  far  more  heterogeneous.  As 
2 The Agricultural  Markets  Observatory  was designed  to collect and  disperse  information  
about  agricultural  markets  actual state, as well as forecasts.  maize  s considered  as  a modern  cereal  and  mainly  consumed  by the  urban  
population,  we aim  at  investigating  whether  the  integration  of millet  market  
that  has been  showed  by previous  studies  can be related  to the development  of 
a   market   for   maize.   Therefore,   we   analyse   the   temporality   of   integration  
intensification  of these  markets  during  the  period.  We show  the  integration  of 
millet  market  is contemporaneous  to the  increase  in substitution  between  the  
two  cereals  at  the  local market  level and  that  the  development  of a spatially 
integrated  maize  market  is slower.
All series  exhibit  a unit  root  (the null of a unit  root  is rejected  at 1% level, and  
for most  of them  at 5% level), that  is that  they don’t follow a random  walk, and  
are  at  least  first- order  integrated.  We report  in  figure  2  the  results  of  the  
augmented  Dickey Fuller  test  , which  is similar  to Dickey Fuller  standard  test  
but   allows   for   heteroscedasticity   and   thus   gives   more   robust   results.   Lag 
selection  correspond  to Akaike information  criterion  (in brackets)
Figure 2: Unit root test
Millet Maize
Bamako  (1)       -  1,323 (1)      -  2,662
Gao (1)      -  1,935 (1)      -  3,023
Kayes (3)      -  2,879 (1)      -  2,297
Mopti (1)      -  2,569 (2)      -  2,904
Ségou (1)      -  2,967 (1)      -  3,087
Sikasso (8)      -  1,863 (8)      -  2,064
Tombouctou (1)      -  1,323 (1)      -  2,426
1% critical value: -  3,478
5% critical value: -  2,945
3.2. Model 
As   unit   roots   are   present   for   all   series,   we   can   proceed   to   the   study   of 
cointegration.  Based  on the  traditional  Johansen  and  Juselius  (1990) approach,  
the technique  is the following: 
Consider  the Vector Error Correction  Model (VECM) 
t p t p t t t X X X X e + D P + + D P + D P = D - - - .... 2 2 1 1
where  et  residual,  Xt  vector  of prices  (Xt  to  Xt- p+1  are  integrated  at  least  from  
order  1, Xt- p+1  is order  0 integrated,  that  is it has  no unit  root) and  Πp matrix of 
coefficients  whose  rank  is r. 
The Johansen  & Juselius  method  of estimation  of   generates  two statistics  of Π  
interest:  The  first  is  the  ltrace  statistic,  which  is  a test  of  the  general  question  of 
whether   there   exist   one   or   more   cointegrating   vectors   (r 1).   An   alternative   test ≥  
statistic   is   the  lmax  statistic,   which   allows   testing   of   the   precise   number   of 
cointegrating  vectors  (r=1, for instance). As the  rank  of matrix  cannot  be higher  than  
the  number  of prices  taken  into  account,  the  highest  number  of cointegrating  vectors  
is 1 when  investigating  the cointegration  between  two series. We analyse  the spatial cointegration  of millet and  maize  markets  from  April 1989  to 
August  2004  and  compare  this  evolution  to the  cointegration  dynamics  of millet  and  
maize  at  the  local  level. As only  two  price  series  are  studied  in the  latter  case,  we 
choose  to present  the  ltrace statistic  for each municipality. In a recursive  analysis  these  
test  statistics  can  be plotted  over  time  to examine  the  time  varying  nature  of market  
integration.  The following graphs  present  the  evolution  of the  spatial cointegration  of 
both  millet  and  maize  markets  (Figure  3), and  the  dynamic  of local cointegration  of 
both  market,  that  is the  evolution  of the  substitutability between  the  two products,  at 
the local level (Figure 4).
We chose  to study  real prices  as the  inflation  rate  was high  for some  periods:  in fact,  
this  inflationary  nation- wide  phenomenon  can  bias  the  result  because  it artificially 
introduce  a common  trend  in the  local  dynamics.  Therefore,  nominal  prices  should  
bias   upward   the   cointegration   result.   We   corrected   the  SIM/OMA   (Système  
d’Information   de   Marché/Observatoire   des   Marchés   Agricoles   or   Market  
Information  System/  Agricultural  Markets  Observatory) prices  by deflating  the  
series  using  the  Banque  de France  data  for the  Franc  Area (Zone Franc  and  FC 
area).
3.3 Results
[Figure 3 and  4 about  here]
We observe  on these  two graphs  that  the integration  of all considered  markets  
increased  along the period: however  this is a non  monotonous  evolution. In 
particular, the millet and  maize  markets  are affected  by two shocks  that  
decrease  the integration  level – these  shocks  are marked  by a line. From 1996  
to 1997, the integration  level of both  markets  sharply declined, as it did in 
2001- 02, but  in a less sensible way. 
The first  observation  refers  to the  overall amelioration  of market  functioning  
(see  section  1  for  a description  of  public  policies  oriented  towards  market  
transparency) as well as to the  decrease  of transaction  costs.  In particular,  the 
quality  of  the  transport  network  improved  as  a  result  of  work  undertaken  
under  the  1995- 2004  sectoral  transport  project  (OECD, 2006). It expanded  the  
roads  system  to Kayes  (to be finished  in December  2006). To the  North  East, 
the  road  Gao- Ansongo  to  Niger  has  been  enhanced,  a project  that  helps  to 
reduce  the  country’s  isolation  and  its  dependence  on  the  port  of Abidjan  – a 
very risky  road  to procure  imports  since  the  civil unrest  experienced  by Côte 
d’Ivoire. The Ivorian  crisis  forced  Mali to put  a priority  on combating  its land-
lacked  position. 
Furthermore,  contrarily  to  the  evolution  observed  in Burkina  Faso  where  fuel 
price   increased   transportation   costs,   Mali   didn’t   experienced   a   sensible  
increase  in its  transportation  cost  or  production  factor  price  (Traore  and  al, 
2003). 
These  two phenomena  favour  market  integration  at the national  level.
However, we can see that  this  evolution  is not  monotonous.  The first  inflexion  
point  correspond  to the devaluation  of the CFA Franc (common  currency in the  West  African  Monetary  Zone) in 1994.  This  change  in parity  rate  immediately  
increased   the   competitiveness   of   Malian   cereals,   that   are   namely   tradable  
goods,  and  stimulated  internal  trade  also  (Dembélé  and  Staatz,  2000).  The 
mechanism  at  stake,  that  has  been  reveal  by the  recent  study  developed  by 
Araujo  et alii (2005) may  work  in the  following  way: as the  prices  of imports  
are  decreasing  with  the  devaluation,  the  prices  of  inputs  are  decreasing.  In 
particular,  Araujo  et  alii  put  the  stress  on  the  price  of  labour  which  they  
consider  to be the most  important  part  of trade  costs. In their  view, it becomes  
cheaper   to   trade   products   across   regions:   this   analytical   result   was 
successfully tested  for the livestock  market  in Burkina  Faso. 
We can see a sharp  slowdown  of co- movement  of prices  of millet and  maize  in 
2000. The weather  was particularly bad  during  the 2000/01  growing season  
and  this reduced  cereal production  by about  20 per cent  (OECD, 2003). Except 
for rice (up 2 per cent), output  of all other  grains  fell sharply (as much  as 65 
per cent  in the case of maize). This poor  food- crop  performance  was 
accompanied  by the collapse  of cotton  production,  hit by steadily falling world 
prices  since 1995  and  major  structural  problems.  The slowdown  in activity 
linked  with the cotton  crisis sharply reduced  household  revenues  in 2001, 
cutting  back private  consumption  1.6 per cent by volume. It has  been  shown  
(Egg & Tallec, 2004) that  Malian consumers  are substituting  products  for a 
preferred  one up to a price threshold.  Thus, they are willing to pay more  for 
quality or for goods  that  give them  a higher  satisfaction  level when  prices  are 
in general not to high: the budget  constraint  limited  the possibility to pay. 
However, this  decrease  in the  substitution  of millet  and  maize  doesn’t imply a 
slowdown   in   the   spatial   integration   of   local   markets.   In   fact,   in   case   of 
production  shortage,  traders  adapt  all the  more  to  market  opportunities  and  
they  make  even  a much  more  accurate  trade- off  among  the  places  they  can  
market  their  products  into  (Traore,  Jeudy  & Blein,  2003).  Furthermore,  this  
trade- off   seems   not   to   have   been   influenced   by   government   messages  
concerning  its intervention.
Last, we remark  that  2002  is a breaking  point  in the evolution  of integration  in 
the  national  market:  we notice  an  acceleration  of  it  in  2002,  followed  by  a 
deceleration  during  the  next  few years. The year  2002  was a turning  point  for  
Mali when  it  hosted  the  Africa  Nations  Cup  football  tournament  and  held  
presidential  and  parliamentary  elections  that  led  to  the  first- ever  peaceful  
handover  of  power  by  one  group  to  another.  The  Africa  Cup  event  greatly 
boosted  economic  development;  the  government  took  the  occasion  seriously  
and   seized   the   opportunity   to   develop   the   country’s   infrastructure.   Many 
roads  were  built  or repaired  in Bamako  and  several  provincial  towns,  such  as 
Kayes and  Sikasso, got airstrips.  The private  sector  also invested  heavily in the  
event, mainly in hotels. Related  sectors,  such  as electricity and  telephones,  also 
benefited.
Furthermore,  growth  was sustained  by the mining  sector. Mali has  opened  up 
new deposits  — at Morila in October  2000  and  Yatela in May 2001. These new 
mines  almost  doubled  national  production  in 2001. 
The increase  in real prices  in 2002/03  (Traore, Jeudy, Blein, 2003) is not due to 
a  decrease  in  production,  but  to  improved  marketing  strategies  of  traders.  Price levels  are  since  then  high  and  the  differential  price  between  millet  and  
maize  is tightening.
Conclusion  
The joint  dynamic  of the  integration  of maize  and  millet  markets  in Mali is a 
complex  one.  Maize  is  a modern  cereal  towards  which  urban  population  is 
turning  to and  that  becomes  continuously  more  consumed  in remote  areas. We 
show  that  even  if the  substitution  between  these  two cereals  is highly volatile, 
depending  mostly on the price levels, the spatial integration  of both  markets  is 
increasing  during  the period  1993- 2004.Figure 3
 integration of millet and maize markets, 
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Mean         D2003/1990
Std Dev           D
2003/1990 Min Max
Millet Bamako 119,7 97,8% 40,3 - 19,4% 62,0 222,5
Gao 120,6 68,3% 36,9 - 1,8% 66,6 206,5
Kayes 155,1 157,4% 53,7 - 52,5% 63,0 250,0
Mopti 107,2 100,0% 40,8 46,1% 48,0 209,8
Ségou 92,6 105,8% 38,2 - 4,1% 40,7 180,6
Sikasso 119,1 96,4% 39,4 - 18,6% 56,0 220,2
Tombouctou 134,3 93,2% 41,4 132,5% 60,0 217,5
Maize Bamako 111,5 76,1% 33,5 41,4% 61,2 195,4
Gao 119,8 64,3% 34,8 22,0% 44,4 190,5
Kayes 135,5 110,7% 47,3 72,3% 55,4 245,8
Mopti 100,7 99,7% 37,5 105,2% 40,0 185,0
Ségou 92,9 99,3% 36,1 115,5% 42,8 183,2
Sikasso 84,9 78,2% 28,1 123,0% 45,9 164,4
Tombouctou 114,8 395,6% 51,3 - 30,0% 20,0 212,0
D2003/1990  is the variation in mean prices and standard errors between 1990 and 2003 (in 












































































TombouctouAppendix  2b : Maize price evolution  in considered  local markets
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